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Laws	and	Powers	in	the	Frame	of	Nature	
	
Stathis	Psillos1	
	
	Till	a	philosopher,	at	last,	arose,	who	seems,	from	the	happiest	reasoning,	to	have	also	determined	the	laws	and	forces,	by	which	the	revolutions	of	the	planets	are	governed	and	directed.		David	Hume	(First	Enquiry,	section	I,	14)		
1.	Introduction	Within	the	Aristotelian	framework	of	natural	philosophy,	which	was	dominant	until	the	emergence	of	the	mechanical	philosophy,	activity,	motion	and	change	in	nature	were	taken	to	be	grounded	in	powerful	substances.	From	the	seventeenth	century	on,	this	view	started	to	recede	in	favour	of	a	conception	of	nature	as	governed	by	general	laws	of	nature	and	of	motion	in	particular.	This	new	conception	was	introduced,	almost	single-handedly,	by	Rene	Descartes	but	it	spread	quickly.2	Part	of	the	motivation	was	a	thorough	critique	of	the	widespread	view	that,	when	it	comes	to	natural	bodies,	they	possess	active	and	passive	powers	in	virtue	of	which	they	interact	with	each	other.	Natural	powers	were	taken	to	be	necessity-enforcers	in	that	they	were,	in	and	of	themselves,	principles	of	necessitation:	given	the	power	of	X	to	Φ,	X	must	Φ	when	the	appropriate	circumstances	arise.	Hence,	powers	were	regularity–enforcers:	they	accounted	for	the	regularity	there	is	in	the	world.		 The	new	conception	of	laws	emerged	as	an	alternative	to	powers.	Corporeal	substances	were	widely	taken	to	be	passive	and	inert.	Hence,	activity,	motion	and	change	could	not	arise	from	within	a	powerful	matter.	They	had	to	be	imposed	on	matter	from	without	and	this	meant	that	there	was	need	for	new	principles	of	connection,	viz.,	principles	which	determined	the	ways	pieces	of	matter	move	and	collide	with	each	other.	Laws	of	nature	were	broadly	taken	to	be	the	required	principles	of	connection.	This	very	move	was	itself	based	on	a	thorough	reconceptualisation	of	the	very	idea	of	natural	law.	The	notion	was	widely	applicable	to	rational	beings	only,	since	the	dominant	thought	was	that	only	rational	beings	can	obey	the	law.	After	Descartes,	the	concept	of	law	was	widely	taken	to	apply	to	all	beings;	and	in	particular	to	passive	corporeal	substances.3			 The	new	principles	of	connection—laws	of	nature—retained	a	key	feature	of	the	powers-based	account	of	activity	in	nature,	viz.,	necessity.	They	were	meant	to	hold	by	necessity,	thought	what	kind	of	necessity	this	is	was	very	much	in	dispute.	They	were	also	meant	to	necessitate	the	behaviour	of	things:	things	had																																																									
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to	obey	the	laws	that	governed	their	behaviour.	But	if	there	is	no	power	in	matter,	how	does	matter	act	on	matter?	Broadly	speaking,	there	are	two	options	available,	given	the	passivity	of	matter.	The	first	is	that	matter	exists	but	God	is	the	only	motive	force	(this	is	the	line	followed	by	Malebranche	and	came	to	be	known	as	Occasionalism).	The	other	is	to	deny	the	existence	of	matter	altogether	(since	there	is	nothing	for	it	to	do)	and	to	claim	that	God	is	the	direct	cause	of	all	ideas	in	minds	(this	leads	to	Berkeley’s	idealism).	On	both	options,	laws	play	a	key	role:	they	replace	powers	and	provide	the	missing	connections	between	distinct	existences.		The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	revisit	the	major	arguments	of	the	seventeenth	century	debate	concerning	laws	and	powers.	Its	primary	points	are	two.	First,	though	the	dominant	conception	of	nature	was	such	that	there	was	no	room	for	power	in	bodies,	the	very	idea	that	laws	govern	the	behaviour	of	(bits	of)	matter	in	motion	brought	with	it	the	following	issue,	which	came	under	sharp	focus	in	the	work	of	Leibniz:	how	possibly	can	passive	matter,	devoid	of	power,	obey	laws?	Though	Leibniz’s	answer	was	to	re-introduce	powers,	two	radically	different	conceptualisations	of	the	relation	between	laws	and	powers	became	available	after	him.	Hume	denied	powers	altogether,	whereas	Newton	thought	that	to	introduce	a	power	is	to	introduce	a	law.	The	second	main	point	will	be	that	though	laws	were	meant	to	replace	powers,	the	real	dilemma	ended	up	being	not	laws	vs	powers,	but	rather	necessity	vs	non-necessity	in	nature.	To	exploit,	an	expression	used	by	Newton,	the	question	was:	what	is	the	place	of	necessity	in	the	frame	of	nature?		
2.	Against	Laws;	Against	Powers	For	Mediaeval	thinkers,	natural	agency	was	fundamental	and	explicable	in	terms	of	the	powers	of	the	natural	agents	themselves.	God,	however,	was	taken	to	be	the	author	of	the	order	of	the	world	and	its	ordering	to	an	end.	So,	though	there	is	order	in	the	world	and	in	this	sense	God	is	the	Divine	order-maker,	He	does	not	posit	laws	of	nature	over	and	above	the	active	natures	of	natural	things.	Insofar	as	there	is	talk	of	‘laws	of	nature’,	this	is	a	metaphorical	extension	of	the	concept	from	the	realm	of	free	agents	to	nature.4		 One	can	see	this	kind	of	approach	very	clearly	in	the	work	of	the	late	Medieval	thinker	Francisco	Suarez.	According	to	Thomas	Aquinas	(Summa,	I-II	q.90	art.1):	“Law	(lex)	is	a	certain	rule	and	measure	in	accordance	with	which	one	is	induced	to	act	or	is	restrained	from	acting”	(Suarez	1612,	7)	Thus	put,	Suarez	notes,	the	definition	of	law	is	“too	broad	and	general”	precisely	because	it	allows	that	it	is	applicable	to	non-sentient	beings,	since	“everything	has	its	own	rule	and	measure,	in	accordance	with	which	it	operates	and	is	induced	to	act	or	in	restrained	therefrom”.	For	Suarez,	however,	laws,	strictly	speaking,	require	rational	agency.	A	law	is	something	that	has	to	be	(and	can	be)	obeyed	(executed)	and	this	can	only	be	satisfied	by	rational	creatures.	In	this	sense,	the	claim	that	non-sentient	beings	obey	laws	would	amount	to	the	claim	that	they	act	according	to	the	their	natural	powers.	Indeed,	insofar	as	this	metaphorical	sense	of	law	is	used,	it	can	only	refer	to	the	orderly	action	of	natural	bodies	“in	accordance	with	the	inclinations	imparted	to	them	by	the	Author	of	Nature”	(1944,	22).	Seen	that	way,	talk	of	natural	laws	is	talk	about	natural	powers.	It																																																									4	This	point	has	been	recently	stressed	by	Marilyn	McCord	Adams	(2013).	
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captures	the	natural	necessity	there	is	in	nature	and	it	is	to	this	natural	necessity	that	can	be	“metaphorically	given	the	name	of	law”	(ibid.).		Note,	in	addition,	that	if	talk	of	laws	of	nature	is	talk	about	powers,	there	are	as	many	‘laws	of	nature’	as	there	are	powers—a	law	for	each	power	in	nature.	Laws	of	nature,	then,	play	no	role	whatsoever	as	unifiers.	Still,	if	this	metaphorical	use	is	made,	there	must	be	a	law-maker	who	governs	the	things	that	‘obey	the	law’.	As	Suarez	put	it,	insofar	as	non-rational	beings	are	said	to	obey	a	law,	they	are	“in	need	of	a	superior	governing	mind”	(…)	“and	thus	from	every	standpoint,	law	must	be	related	to	mind”.	In	sum,	then,	talk	of	laws	is	metaphorical	and	its	proper	content	concerns	natural	necessities	which	are	grounded	in	the	natural	inclinations	of	things	imparted	on	them	by	the	law-maker.		The	emergence	of	mechanical	natural	philosophy	in	the	seventeenth	century	brought	with	it	a	war	against	(natural)	powers.	Qua	a	sui	generis	category	that	explains	or	grounds	motion	and	change	in	nature,	power	came	under	heavy	fire.	Here	are	the	main	arguments	against	powers.5		
The	connection	problem:	how	are	powers	connected?	How	is	it	that	X	having	the	power	to	Φ	and	Y	having	the	power	to	be	Φ-ed	(two	distinct	existences)	interact	to	give	rise	to	an	effect?	According	to	Descartes,	the	power	of	X	to	Φ	is	not	sui	generis	but	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	matter	in	motion.	All	there	is	to	explain	how	X	acts	on	Y	is	action	by	contact	of	the	parts	of	X	on	the	parts	of	Y.	In	his	Le	Monde,	Descartes	objected	to	the	medieval	Aristotelian	view	that	fire	has	the	(sui	generis)	power	to	burn	wood	that	all	there	is	to	the	action	of	fire	on	wood	can	and	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	violent	and	incessant	motion	of	the	parts	of	fire:		 When	[fire]	burns	wood	or	other	similar	material	we	can	see	with	our	eyes	that	it	moves	the	small	parts	of	the	wood,	separating	them	from	one	another,	thereby	transforming	the	finer	parts	into	fire,	air,	and	smoke,	and	leaving	the	larger	parts	as	ashes.	Someone	else	may	if	he	wishes	imagine	the	‘form’	of	fire,	the	‘quality’	of	heat,	and	the	‘action’	of	burning	to	be	very	different	things	in	the	wood.	For	my	own	part,	I	am	afraid	of	going	astray	if	I	suppose	there	to	be	in	the	wood	anything	more	than	what	I	see	must	necessarily	be	there,	so	I	am	satisfied	to	confine	myself	to	conceiving	the	motion	of	its	parts.	For	you	may	posit	‘fire’	and	‘heat’	in	the	wood,	and	make	it	burn	as	much	as	you	please:	but	if	you	do	not	suppose	in	addition	that	some	of	its	parts	move	about	and	detach	themselves	from	their	neighbours,	I	cannot	imagine	it	undergoing	any	alteration	or	change	(1998,	6).			In	effect,	Descartes’s	point	is	that	even	if	powers	were	posited,	they	would	fail	to	explain,	in	and	of	themselves,	change	in	nature;	the	proper	explanation	would	require	reference	to	the	action	of	the	parts	of	the	bodies	that	bear	the	‘active	power’	on	the	parts	of	the	bodies	that	bear	the	‘passive	power’.	But	this	very	move	would	make	powers	redundant,	since	all	the	action	would	be	due	to	the	motion	of	the	parts	of	bodies.			 This	kind	of	argument	against	powers	is	directed	primarily	against	viewing	powers	as	sui	generis.	Power	is	not	a	specific	kind	of	cause	of	motion/change,	distinct	for	each	kind	of	motion/change.	All	motion/change	in	nature	should	be	understood	as	being	of	the	same	kind,	viz.,	the	result	of	action	by	contact	between	the	parts	of	matter.	Objecting	to	the	view	that	powers	are	sui	generis																																																									5	For	further	insightful	discussion,	see	Ott	(2009,	chapter	5).	
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principles	of	motion,	Descartes	noted:	“The	Philosophers	also	posit	many	motions	which	they	believe	can	occur	without	any	body’s	changing	place,	such	as	those	they	call	motus	ad	formam,	motus	ad	calorem,	motus	ad	quantitatem	(motion	with	respect	to	form,	motion	with	respect	to	heat,	motion	with	respect	to	quantity)	and	countless	others”	(1998,	26).	But	he	added:	“I	know	of	no	motion	other	than	that	which	is	easier	to	conceive	of	than	the	lines	of	geometers,	by	which	bodies	pass	from	one	place	to	another	and	successively	occupy	all	the	spaces	in	between”	(1998,	27).	Hence,	all	motion	should	be	understood	univocally	as	local	motion,	and	if	a	sense	of	power	is	still	operative	it	can	at	best	be	seen	as	the	power	of	matter	to	be	moved	(mobility).			 For	Descartes,	then,	there	are	no	sui-generis	powers	in	nature.	To	understand	all	change	in	nature	it	is	enough	to	conceive	the	motions	of	the	parts	of	matter—subject	to	universal	laws,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section.	Speaking	again	against	the	alleged	sui	generis	power	of	fire	to	burn,	Descartes	(1998,	8)	noted:		 Once	we	appreciate	that	the	parts	of	the	flame	move	in	this	way,	and	that	to	understand	how	the	flame	has	the	power	to	consume	the	wood	and	to	burn	it,	it	is	enough	to	conceive	of	their	motions,	I	ask	you	to	consider	whether	this	is	not	also	sufficient	for	us	to	understand	how	the	flame	provides	us	with	heat	and	light.	For	if	this	is	the	case,	the	flame	will	need	possess	no	other	quality,	and	we	shall	be	able	to	say	that	it	is	this	motion	alone	that	is	called	now	‘heat’	and	now	‘light’,	according	to	the	different	effects	it	produces.			
The	occultness	problem:	This	is	a	version	of	the	connection	problem	above.	But	it	is	worth	treating	it	separately	because	the	emphasis	is	shifted	to	the	claim	that,	in	principle,	there	is	no	understanding	of	how	a	power	brings	about	its	effect.	In	a	letter	to	Regius	in	January	1642,	Descartes	(1991,	208-9)	noted:		 But	no	natural	action	at	all	can	be	explained	by	these	substantial	forms,	since	their	defenders	admit	that	they	are	occult	and	that	they	do	not	understand	them	themselves.	If	they	say	that	some	action	proceeds	from	a	substantial	form,	it	is	as	if	they	said	that	it	proceeds	from	something	they	do	not	understand;	which	explains	nothing.	So	these	forms	are	not	to	be	introduced	to	explain	the	causes	of	natural	actions.		We	may	call	this,	the	explanatory	impotence	argument.	Substantial	forms	were	individuating	principles	that	once	joined	with	specific	parcels	of	prime	matter	made	them	into	substances	with	a	specific	causal	profile.	So,	for	instance,	the	substantial	forms	of	hard	bodies	was	different	from	the	substantial	form	of	fluid	bodies	and	this	primitive	difference	explained	their	different	powers.	But	for	Descartes	no	explanation	of	the	difference	is	thereby	achieved:	the	difference	is	simply	posited	as	a	primitive	fact.	For	him,	the	only	difference	between	hard	bodies	and	fluid	bodies	is	“that	the	parts	of	the	one	can	be	separated	from	the	whole	much	more	easily	than	those	of	the	other”	(1998,	10).	This	is	supposed	to	amount	to	a	genuine	explanation	of	why	there	are	two	distinct	kinds	of	qualities—hardness	and	fluidity—the	difference	being	grounded	in	the	micro-parts	of	bodies	and	their	motions.	Instead	of	taking	these	qualities	as	primitive,	Descartes	explains	them	by	showing	that	they	are	different	species	of	motion	of	the	particles	of	matter.	Here	is	how	he	put	it:		 If	you	find	it	strange	that,	in	explaining	these	elements,	I	do	not	use	the	qualities	called	‘heat’,	‘cold’,	‘moistness’,	and	‘dryness’,	as	the	Philosophers	do,	I	shall	say	that	these	qualities	appear	to	me	to	be	themselves	in	need	of	explanation.	Indeed,	unless	I	am	mistaken,	not	only	these	four	qualities	but	all	others	as	well,	including	even	the	forms	of	
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inanimate	bodies,	can	be	explained	without	the	need	to	suppose	anything	in	their	matter	other	than	motion,	size,	shape,	and	arrangement	of	its	parts	(1998,	18).			
The	directedness	problem:	how	can	a	physical	quality	be	directed	to	another?	This	was,	in	many	ways,	the	more	puzzling	feature	of	powers.	Medieval-Aristotelian	powers	were	endowed	with	esse-ad.	This	was	supposed	to	show	how	“one	thing	receives	something	from	another	or	confers	it	upon	the	other”	(Aquinas)	without	the	qualities	of	each	thing	being	shared	by	the	other.	But	the	puzzle	was	precisely	how	a	quality	can	be	intrinsic	to	a	subject	and	‘bear’	on	another.	For	Descartes,	this	relatedness	can	only	be	a	feature	of	minds	and	their	content:	only	minds	can	be	directed	towards	anything.	Hence,	either	matter	should	be	endowed	with	minds	or	there	can	be	no	such	thing	in	matter	as	‘being	directed	to	an	effect’.	The	first	horn	is	precisely	the	one	Descartes	dismissed	by	what	came	to	be	known	as	‘the	little	souls	argument’.	In	a	letter	to	Mersenne,	(26	April	1643)	he	noted:		 I	do	not	suppose	there	are	in	nature	any	real	qualities,	which	are	attached	to	substances,	like	 so	many	 little	 souls	 to	 their	 bodies,	 and	 which	 are	 separable	 from	 them	 by	 divine	power.	 Motion,	 and	 all	 the	 other	 modifications	 of	 substance	 which	 are	 called	 qualities,	have	no	greater	reality,	in	my	view,	than	is	commonly	attributed	by	philosophers	to	shape,	which	they	call	only	a	mode	and	not	a	real	quality	(1991,	216).			The	reference	here	is	to	the	medieval	idea	that	qualities	can	exist	independently	of	substances.	But	what’s	interesting	is	that	Descartes	takes	it	that	these	qualities	were	endowed	with	directedness	as	if	they	were	soul-like	entities.	As	he	explained	in	a	letter	to	Princess	Elizabeth,	21May	1643,	real	qualities	were	conceived	by	means	of	notions	that	were	used	“for	the	purpose	of	knowing	the	soul”	(1991,	219).	Gravity,	one	of	Descartes’s	favourite	examples,	is	a	case	in	point.	Descartes	noted	that	instead	of	taking	the	view	that	heaviness	is	a	kind	of	motion	which	is	“produced	by	a	real	contact	between	two	surfaces”	(1991,	219),	his	medieval	predecessors,	starting	from	the	“inner	experience”	of	how	the	soul	operates	on	bodies,	took	it	that	heaviness	is	a	real	quality	“of	which	all	we	know	is	that	it	has	the	power	to	move	the	body	that	possesses	it	towards	the	centre	of	the	earth”	(1991,	219),	thereby	wrongly	attributing	to	it	soul-like	attributes.	Speaking	critically	of	his	former	self	in	the	sixth	set	of	replies	he	noted	that	he	too	used	to	ascribe	to	gravity	some	kind	of	directed	power	to	carry	bodies	
towards	the	centre	of	the	earth	“as	if	it	had	some	knowledge	of	the	centre”.	But	he	changed	his	mind	when	he	realised	that	this	was	tantamount	to	applying	mind-like	properties	to	gravity;	for	this	directedness	“surely	could	not	happen	without	knowledge,	and	there	can	be	no	knowledge	except	in	a	mind”	(1984,	298).		
The	motive	force	problem:	How	can	a	body	move	itself	or	another	body?	This	question	was	thrown	into	sharp	relief	by	Nicolas	Malebranche	who	concluded	that	the	only	motive	power	is	(in)	God.	According	to	a	widely	accepted	account	of	God’s	action,	God	continuously	annihilates	and	re-creates	everything	there	is.	When	God	wills	a	body	A	to	come	to	existence,	he	wills	it	to	be	in	a	specific	space	a	at	a	specific	time	t.	How,	then,	Malebranche	asks,	can	the	body	A	move	from	point	a	to	another	point	b	all	by	itself?	Or	how	can	it	be	moved	by	the	‘power’	of	another	body	B?	In	either	case	(self-motion	or	motion-by-other)	the	required	
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power	would	‘supersede’	the	power	of	God,	who	willed	body	A	to	be	in	point	a.	Since	nothing	can	supersede	God’s	power,	only	God	has	the	power	to	move	a	body.	Malebranche	concluded	that	“there	is	a	contradiction	in	saying	that	one	body	can	move	another”,	since	“no	power,	however	vast	it	may	be	imagined	to	be,	can	surpass	or	even	equal	the	power	of	God”;	“no	power	can	transport	[a	body]	whither	God	does	not	transport	it,	nor	fix	or	keep	it	where	God	does	not	fix	or	keep	it,	if	it	is	God	alone	who	adapts	the	efficacy	of	His	actions	to	the	ineffective	actions	of	His	creations”	(Dialogues	on	Metaphysics	7,	X;	1923,	189).	
	 Arguments	such	as	the	above	cast	considerable	doubt	on	the	idea	that	matter	is	powerful.	But	if	there	is	no	power	in	matter,	what	options	are	available?	Laws	of	nature	replaced	powers	as	principles	of	connection	between	distinct	existences.	But	laws	did	not	replace	necessity.	Instead,	they	captured	the	necessity	that	was	taken	to	be	grounded	in	powers.	But	how	do	laws	acquire	their	necessity	and	what	kind	of	necessity	is	this?6		
3.	Cartesian	Laws	In	Descartes’s	Principia,	which	appeared	in	1644,	God	is	the	primary	cause	of	all	motion.	But	laws	of	nature	become	themselves	the	particular	causes	“by	which	individual	parts	of	matter	acquire	movements	which	they	did	not	previously	have”	(Part	II,	36;	1982,	58).	They	account	for	changes	of	states	of	motion	of	bodies:	“the	rules	or	laws	of	nature	(…)	are	the	secondary	and	particular	causes	of	the	diverse	movements	which	we	notice	in	individual	bodies”	(Part	II,	37;	1982,	59).	But	what	does	that	mean?	How	can	laws	be	secondary	causes?	To	answer	this	question	let	us	first	take	a	look	at	Descartes’s	three	laws	of	motion.	In	the	Cartesian	picture	of	things,	God	created	matter	in	motion	and	rest	“and	now	maintains	in	the	sum	total	of	matter,	by	His	normal	participation,	the	same	quantity	of	motion	and	rest	as	He	placed	in	it	at	that	time”	(Part	II,	36;	1982,	58).	Throughout	his	work,	this	is	a	fundamental	idea:	the	conservation	of	the	total	quantity	of	motion	placed	in	nature	by	God	initially.	This	is	not	a	law—it	is	a	governing	principle.	It	follows	directly	from	the	immutability	of	God.	In	fact,	it	can	be	said	that	this	Principle	of	Conservation	of	the	Quantity	of	Motion	(PCQM)	is	simply	a	facet	of	God.7	Note	that	God	might	not	have	chosen	to	put	matter	in	motion.	Hence,	PCQM	depends	on	God’s	Will	in	the	sense	that	He	willed	to	set	matter	in	motion.	But	given	this	volition,	PCQM	is	metaphysically	necessary.	God	being	immutable,	PCQM	has	to	hold	is	all	possible	worlds	in	which	matter	is	in	motion.			 The	three	fundamental	laws	of	nature	are	grounded	in	PCQM,	that	is	in	the	immutability	of	God.	They	are	part	of	the	fabric	of	the	world.	Given	his	will	to	set	matter	in	motion,	PCQM	and	the	fundamental	laws	are	a	constitutive	part	of	nature:	they	follow	from	his	immutability.	Everything	that	happens	in	nature	is	subject	to	them.	Motion,	in	other	words,	is	regulated	by	God	via	laws,	subject	to	an	overall	PCQM.	Descartes	says:	“because	God	moved	the	parts	of	matter	in																																																									6	For	lack	of	space	I	do	not	discuss	Descartes’s	account	of	laws	and	power	in	Le	Monde.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	it	is	arguable	that	Descartes	changed	his	position	in	moving	from	Le	Monde	to	his	mature	work	Principia.	Briefly	put,	in	Le	Monde	laws	play	a	causal	role,	but	matter	is	causally	active	too.	For	further	discussion,	and	for	what	I	take	it	to	be	the	right	account	of	the	transition	from	Le	Monde	to	Principia,	see	Ott	(2009,	55ff).		7	For	some	similar	thoughts	see	Garber	(2013).	
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diverse	ways	when	He	first	created	them,	and	still	maintains	all	this	matter	exactly	as	it	was	at	its	creation,	and	subject	to	the	same	law	as	at	that	time;	He	also	always	maintains	in	it	an	equal	quantity	of	motion”	(Part	II,	36;	1982,	58).	Then	come	the	three	laws.		 The	first	law:	“that	each	thing,	as	far	as	is	in	its	power,	always	remains	in	the	same	state;	and	that	consequently,	when	it	is	once	moved,	it	always	continues	to	move”	(Part	II,	37;	1982,	59).		 For	Descartes	motion	and	rest	(lack	of	motion)	are	two	distinct	states	of	matter.	Rest	(change	of	state	of	motion	to	Rest)	requires	external	agency	(collision).	Nothing	moves	from	being	in	motion	to	being	in	lack	of	motion	(Rest)	“by	virtue	of	its	own	nature”	because	this	would	mean	that	it	would	move	“toward	its	opposite	or	its	own	destruction”.	This	is	the	justification	of	the	first	law.	Descartes	notes	that	this	law	“results	from	the	immutability	and	simplicity	of	the	operation	by	which	God	maintains	movement	in	matter”	(Part	II,	39;	1982,	60).	What’s	important	to	add	here	is	that	Descartes	explicitly	denies	that	bodies	are	endowed	with	tendencies	or	capacities	to	change	their	state	of	motion	“by	virtue	of	their	own	nature”	(Part	II,	37;	1982,	59).	
The	second	law:	“that	all	movement	is,	of	itself,	along	straight	lines;	and	consequently,	bodies	which	are	moving	in	a	circle	always	tend	to	move	away	from	the	center	of	the	circle	which	they	are	describing”	(Part	II,	39;	1982,	60).	This	law	captures	the	idea	that	circular	motion	is	“forced”	or	“constrained	motion”:	it	is	deviation	from	the	straight	path	due	to	the	encounter	of	other	bodies	or	due	to	the	rigid	connections	among	the	parts	of	a	body	(as	in	the	motion	of	a	wheel).	Descartes’s	justification	is	based	directly	on	the	immutability	of	God	and	the	simplicity	of	his	operations.	This	law	too,	he	says,	“like	the	preceding	one,	results	from	the	immutability	and	simplicity	of	the	operation	by	which	God	maintains	movement	in	matter”	(Part	II,	39;	1982,	60).	The	appeal	to	immutability	of	God	is	essential	because	God	maintains	motion	in	matter	as	it	is	at	every	single	moment.	He	maintains	movement	in	matter	“precisely	as	it	is	at	the	very	moment	at	which	He	is	maintaining	it,	and	not	as	it	may	perhaps	have	been	at	some	earlier	time”	(Part	II,	39;	1982,	60).	But	the	motion	at	each	instant	(or	moment)	is	along	a	straight	line.	Though	“no	movement	is	accomplished	in	an	instant”,	Descartes	considers	it	obvious	that	“every	moving	body,	at	any	given	moment	in	the	course	of	its	movement,	is	inclined	to	continue	that	movement	in	some	direction	in	a	straight	line,	and	never	in	a	curved	one”	(Part	II,	39;	1982,	60).	Simplicity,	however,	is	important,	because	motion	along	a	straight	line	is	simpler	than	curvilinear	motion.	From	this	law,	Descartes	says,	it	follows	that	“any	body	which	is	moving	in	a	circle	constantly	tends	to	move	[directly]	away	from	the	center	of	the	circle	which	it	is	describing”.	Hence,	the	centrifugal	tendency	of	a	rotating	stone	in	the	sling	is	grounded	in	the	second	law.			 The	third	law:	“that	a	body,	upon	coming	in	contact	with	a	stronger	one,	loses	none	of	its	motion;	but	that,	upon	coming	in	contact	with	a	weaker	one,	it	loses	as	much	as	it	transfers	to	that	weaker	body”.		 Descartes	proves	the	third	law	by	appealing	to	the	immutability	of	God.	In	the	creation,	God	gave	motion	to	particles	and	caused	some	of	them	to	collide	with	other.	Because	he	is	immutable,	he	conserves	motion	in	particles;	hence	the	total	quantity	of	motion,	including	this	which	is	transferred	from	one	particle	to	another,	remains	the	same:	“in	now	maintaining	the	world	by	the	same	action	and	with	the	same	laws	with	which	He	created	it,	He	conserves	motion;	not	
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always	contained	in	the	same	parts	of	matter,	but	transferred	from	some	parts	to	others	depending	on	the	ways	in	which	they	come	in	contact”	(Part	II,	42;	1982,	62).	How	then	are	laws	the	“secondary	and	particular	causes	of	the	diverse	movements	which	we	notice	in	individual	bodies”	(Part	II,	37;	1982,	59)?	Given	that	bodies	were	set	in	various	states	of	motion	in	the	beginning,	laws	cause	(i.e.,	determine)	their	subsequent	states.	Why	does	X	move	in	a	straight	line?	Because	it	is	a	law	that	it	must	keep	moving	(it	won’t	change	its	state	of	motion)	until	something	stops	it	(First	law).	In	this	sense,	the	law	is	a	cause	of	the	movement	of	X,	since	it	dictates	(determines)	its	motion.	Similarly,	why	does	X	stop	moving?	(or	why	does	X	change	its	state	of	motion?)	Because	it	is	a	law	that	X	must	change	its	state	of	motion	if	it	collides	with	another	body	Y.	Hence,	change	of	the	state	of	motion	of	X	is	a	law-governed	collision	with	another	body	Y	(Third	law).	Finally,	why	does	X	move	in	a	curved	path?	Not	because	“it	is	inclined	to	any	circular	movement”;	but	because	it	is	a	law	that	motion	along	curved	path	AB	is	forced	motion,	that	is	it	consists	in	a	deviation	from	the	straight	line	(Second	
law).		It	is	striking	that	in	the	Principia,	there	is	no	reference	to	the	dispositions	of	matter	as	causes	of	the	motion	of	the	bodies	alongside	the	laws	of	nature.8	To	be	sure,	Descartes	does	talk	about	affections,	but	he	states	clearly	that	all	dispositions	[omnium	affectionum]	of	matter	arise	out	of	the	movements	of	its	parts;	hence	there	are	no	sui	generis	(non-mechanical)	dispositions	(cf.	Part	II,	23;	(1982,	50).	He	explicitly	states	that	when	he	uses	expressions	such	as	“striving	[conatus]	of	inanimate	objects	toward	motion”,	he	does	not	attribute	any	thought	or	intention	to	them;	he	simply	means	“that	they	are	so	situated,	and	so	urged	to	move	[ad	motum	incitatos],	that	they	will	in	fact	recede	if	they	are	not	restrained	by	any	other	cause”	(part	III,	56;	1982,	112).	And	in	IV.199,	he	sums	up	his	view	by	saying	that	all	natural	phenomena	are	“	nothing	other	than,	certain	dispositions	[dispositiones]	of	size,	figure,	and	motion	{of	bodies}”	(1982,	282).	So	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	for	Descartes	the	references	to	dispositions,	affections	and	the	like	in	the	Principia	are	nothing	other	than	the	(passive)	mechanical	qualities	of	the	corpuscles	of	matter.		In	fact	in	Principia,	forces	and	generic	powers	of	matter	are	fully	replaced	by	laws.9	In	a	characteristic	passage	in	II.43,	Descartes	states	that	“the	force	of	each	body	to	drive	or	to	resist	consists”	in	the	body’s	obeying	the	first	law	of	motion—																																																								8	In	Le	Monde	Descartes	notes	that	though	when	it	comes	to	rectilinear	motion,	it	is	fully	determined	by	the	first	two	laws	and	God’s	conservation	of	things	the	way	they	are,	in	the	case	of	circular	motion,	an	extra	explanatory	principle	is	required,	viz.,	the	dispositions	of	matter.	This	explains	why	though	the	parts	of	a	body	tend	to	move	in	straight	line,	the	body	as	a	whole	moves	in	a	circle.	Here	is	how	he	put	it	(1998,	30):	“According	to	this	rule	[the	third	law	of	motion],	then,	we	must	say	that	God	alone	is	the	author	of	all	the	motions	in	the	world	in	so	far	as	they	exist	and	in	so	far	as	they	are	straight,	but	that	it	is	the	various	dispositions	of	matter	that	render	the	motions	irregular	and	curved.	Likewise,	the	theologians	teach	us	that	God	is	also	the	author	of	all	our	actions,	in	so	far	as	they	exist	and	in	so	far	as	they	have	some	goodness,	but	that	it	is	the	various	dispositions	of	our	wills	that	can	render	them	evil”.	9	Here	I	am	in	agreement	with	Garber	(1992,	298)	who	takes	the	line	that	Cartesian	forces	are	nothing	but	ways	of	talking	about	how	God	acts	on	bodies	in	a	lawful	way.	But,	as	it	will	become	clear	later	on,	I	add	to	Garber’s	account	that,	strictly	speaking,	Descartes	replaces	forces	with	laws	in	the	sense	that	there	is	nothing	more	to	the	content	of	force-talk	than	whatever	is	involved	in	the	law-governed	motion	of	bodies.	For	more	on	the	various	accounts	of	force	in	Descartes	see	Garber	(1992,	chapter	9),	Ayers	(1996)	and	Ott	(2009,	chapter	8).		
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period	(1982,	63).	Descartes	says	that	the	“force	of	each	body	to	act	against	another	or	to	resist	the	action	of	that	other	consists”	(…)	“in	the	single	fact	that	each	thing	strives,	as	far	as	is	in	its	power,	to	remain	in	the	same	state,	in	accordance	with	the	first	law	stated	above”	(op.cit.).	Forces	of	action	or	resistance	are	replaced	by	law-like	behaviour.	Here	is	a	summary	of	the	main	features	of	Cartesian	laws.	
Laws	are	difference-makers:	all	phenomena	in	nature	are	counterfactually	dependent	on	laws.	If	the	laws	had	been	different	(per	impossibile),	the	world	would	have	been	different.	
Laws	are	counterfactually	robust:	No	matter	what	the	initial	arrangement	of	particles	in	motion,	the	laws	are	such	that	the	effect	would	be	the	same.		Which	effect?	The	world	as	we	know	it.		
Laws	are	metaphysically	necessary:	God	agitated	the	different	parts	of	matter	in	diverse	ways,	but	then	He	“did	no	more	than	sustain	nature	in	His	usual	manner	leaving	it	to	act	according	to	the	laws	He	has	established”.	These	laws	are	such	that	“even	if	God	had	created	many	worlds,	there	could	be	not	be	any	in	which	they	could	have	failed	to	be	observed”	(1998,	31).	
Laws	are	immanent:	they	directly	follow	from	God’s	immutability.		
Laws	are	causal	principles:	the	motion	of	the	various	bodies	in	the	world	happen	because	of	them	and	not	simply	according	to	them.		The	passivity	of	matter,	however,	created	a	potential	tension	in	the	Cartesian	system:	How	are	laws	executed	by	matter?	If	matter	is	inert	and	lacks	any	motor	force,	how	is	it	that	pieces	of	matter	are	subjected	to	the	causal	action	of	laws?	Descartes	is	clear	that	bodies	have	“no	innate	tendency	to	motion”	(Part	III,	26;	1982,	94).	Nor	do	they	have	any	“tendency	towards	rest”	(Part	II,	37;	1982,	59).	All	action	is	by	contact	and	requires	a	mover.	He	therefore	puts	forward	seven	rules	by	virtue	of	which	the	collision	of	bodies	is	regulated.		Though	these	rules	were	have	ben	found	wanting,	the	relevant	point	here	is	that	Descartes	introduces	them	as	rules	which	“determine	to	what	extent	the	movement	of	each	body	is	changed	by	coming	in	contact	with	other	bodies”	(part	II,	45;	1982,	64).	This	way	to	formulate	the	task	is	fully	consistent	with	the	claim	that	matter	is	passive	and	hence	that	rules	(laws)	determine	how	(the	quantity	of)	motion	is	redistributed	among	the	colliding	bodies.	But	in	showing	how	these	rules	apply	to	contacts	among	moving	bodies	Descartes	stated	that	“it	is	only	necessary	to	calculate	how	much	force	to	move	or	to	resist	movement	there	is	in	each	body;	and	to	accept	as	a	certainty	that	the	one	which	is	the	stronger	will	always	produce	its	effect”	(Part	II,	45;	1982,	64).	Hence,	it	is	not	clear,	to	say	the	least,	that	Descartes	has	a	coherent	view	about	how	matter	is	capable	to	act	on	matter	and	be	acted	upon	by	matter.	In	a	latter	to	More	(August	1649),	Descartes	noted	that	a	created	substance	can	have	the	power	to	move	a	body;	but	this	is	a	mode	of	the	created	substance	conferred	on	it	by	God	(cf.	1991,	381).	Still	can	motion	be	transferred	from	one	body	to	another?	If	motion	is	a	mode	of	the	thing	moved	(as	it	certainly	is),	then	it	cannot	since	no	mode	can	be	transferred	from	one	body	to	another.	But	as	we	have	already	seen,	Descartes	repeatedly	talks	as	if	motion	is	being	transferred	from	one	body	to	another	because	of	the	laws	of	motion.	In	Principia	(II,	25;	1982,	51)	Descartes	defined	motion	as			 the	translation	of	one	part	of	matter	or	of	one	body,	from	the	vicinity	of	those	bodies	
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immediately	contiguous	to	it	and	considered	as	at	rest,	into	the	vicinity	of	[some]	others.	(…)	I	also	say	that	it	is	a	translation,	not	the	force	or	action	which	transfers	[non	vim	vel	
actionem	quae	transfert],	in	order	to	show	that	this	motion	is	always	in	the	moving	body	and	not	in	the	thing	which	moves	it	(because	it	is	not	usual	to	distinguish	between	these	two	with	sufficient	care);	and	in	order	to	show	that	it	is	only	a	mode	[of	the	moving	body],	and	not	a	substance,	just	as	shape	is	a	mode	of	the	thing	shaped,	and	rest,	of	the	thing	which	is	at	rest.			 In	this	critical	passage,	he	distinguished	clearly	between	motion	as	translation	(i.e.,	change	of	relative	place]	and	motion	as	force	or	action	which	is	transferred	from	one	body	to	another.	But	in	many	other	places	in	the	Principia	Descartes	talks	freely	of	the	‘transference’	on	motion	(see	e.g.,	II,	40	&	42).	A	charitable	reading	of	Descartes	would	be	this.	Strictly	speaking,	there	is	no	transfer	of	motion	between	bodies	(though,	loosely	speaking	their	collisions	can	be	described	as	if	there	were	transfer).	Still,	when	bodies	collide	with	each	other,	the	quantities	of	motion	they	already	possess	are	re-distributed	among	them	
according	to	the	relevant	laws	(and	always	in	line	with	the	overarching	principle	PCQM).	The	laws	then	are	the	(particular	and	secondary)	causes	(difference-makers)	of	the	re-distribution	of	particular	quantities	of	motion,	since	without	them	there	would	be	no	fact	of	the	matter	as	to	what	would	happened	in	the	collision.	
	
4.	Occasionalist	Laws		The	occasionalist	reaction	to	Descartes	was	based	on	the	thought	that	if	matter	is	truly	inert	and	lacking	of	any	motive	power,	then	the	only	real	(and	direct)	cause	should	be	God	himself.	For	Malebranche,	we	have	no	conception	of	power	of	secondary	things.	If	the	only	motive	power	is	(in)	God,	how	does	God	act	on	matter?	The	answer	is	clear:	via	laws.	God	acts	via	laws	because	his	action	is	uniform	and	simple;	it	“link(s)	together	the	parts	which	compose	the	world”	and	makes	the	world	knowable	(1923,	190).	Hence,	laws	are	willed	by	God.	Laws	are	principles	by	means	of	which	God	acts	in	nature	and	establishes	its	uniformity—which	is	a	facet	of	its	perfection.	For	Malebranche,	God	submits	to	laws	not	by	absolute	necessity	but	by	desire	(Treatise	on	Nature	and	Grace	(TNG),	XXI;	1992,	119).	Being	omnipotent,	God	could	have	created	an	infinity	of	possible	worlds.	Hence,	there	could	have	been	a	law-less	(disorderly)	world.	But	God	did	not	desire	to	create	such	a	world;	hence,	he	did	not	will	it.	God	created	an	orderly	world,	governed	by	the	simplest	laws	since	He	acts	“always	by	the	simplest	ways”	(TNG,	XVII;	1992,	118).	In	fact,	of	all	the	possible	(law-governed)	worlds,	he	willed	to	create	“that	world	which	could	have	been	produced	and	preserved	by	the	simplest	laws,	and	which	ought	to	be	the	most	perfect	with	respect	to	the	simplicity	of	the	ways	necessary	to	its	production	or	to	its	conservation”.	(TNG,	XIII;	1992,	116)	So	perfection	is	a	function	of	the	simplicity	of	the	ways	the	world	could	have	been	created	and	conserved.	As	he	says	later	on:	“if	he	had	been	able	(by	equally	simple	ways)	to	make	and	to	preserve	a	more	perfect	world,	he	would	never	have	established	those	laws”	(TNG,	XXII;	1992,	120).	Unlike	Cartesian	laws,	Malebranchean	laws	are	not	grounded	in	the	immutability	of	God	but	in	his	Will	and,	in	particular,	in	his	ways	of	acting.	He	always	acts	in	the	simplest	ways	and	He	always	acts	(in	the	natural	order)	with	general	laws	(volitions).	God	wills	certain	laws	“because	of	their	fruitfulness”.	
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(TNG,	XIX;	1992,	119)	What	then	are	the	laws	of	nature?	They	are	God’s	general	volitions.	They	are	his	decrees.	As	such,	the	laws	of	nature	are	not	metaphysically	necessary.	The	decrees	(laws)	of	God	are	only	ex	hypothesis	necessary.	Hence,	the	question	‘Can	God	change	the	laws?’	admits	of	a	positive	answer.	Like	Descartes,	Malebranche	thought	that	God	could	have	not	set	matter	in	motion	(if	he	had	wished	not	to	produce	anything	new	in	the	world).	But	in	addition,	God	might	will	that	the	actual	laws	of	motion	change	(if,	for	instance,	he	wills	to	create	incorruptible	bodies).		 Though	laws	could	be	different	(or	could	change,	if	God	willed	it),	they	are	constant	and	immutable	and	they	hold	everywhere	and	everywhen.	He	couldn’t	be	more	explicit:	“The	laws	of	nature	are	constant	and	immutable;	they	are	general	for	all	times	and	for	all	places”	(TNG	XVIII;	1992,	118).	In	fact,	it	is	the	very	constancy	and	immutability	of	laws	that	explains	why	in	nature	there	are	unwanted	(or	undesirable)	effects—e.g.	hail	destroys	a	harvest	or	a	malformed	baby	is	born.	For	Malebranche,	it	is	not	that	God	willed,	with	a	particular	volition	these	particular	effects	to	happen.	Rather,	these	effects	are	the	“necessary	consequences”	of	the	laws	of	communication	of	motion	he	had	initially	established	(TNG,	XVIII;	1992,	118).	God	desires	that	“all	of	his	creatures	should	be	perfect”	(op.cit.);	But	he	acts	by	general	laws	which	he	foresees	to	be	the	most	fecund	(cf.	TNG,	XXII;	1992,	119).	These	are	also	the	simplest	laws.	Precisely	because	God	acts	in	the	simplest	ways,	it	would	be	“unworthy	of	his	wisdom	to	multiply	his	wills	in	order	to	stop	certain	particular	disorders”.	Hence,	simple	and	general	laws	‘cover’	everything	that	happens	in	nature,	within	the	natural	(i.e.,	not	miraculous)	order.		 The	two	fundamental	laws	of	nature	are	laws	of	motion:		
The	First	Law:	“that	moved	bodies	tend	to	continue	their	motion	in	a	straight	line”;	(TNG,	XV;	1992,	117)		 The	Second	Law:	“that	when	two	bodies	collide,	their	motion	is	distributed	both	in	proportion	to	their	size,	such	that	they	must	afterwards	move	at	an	equal	speed”	(TNG,	XV;	1992,	117).	According	to	the	second	law,	what	happens	in	collisions	is	the	re-distribution	of	motion	“in	proportion	to	their	size”.	As	Malebranche	noted	this	law	is	not	observed	in	experience;	but	he	noted	that	it	is	a	true	law	holding	in	the	“invisible”	bodies”	(TNG,	XVI;	1992,	117).		 In	Dialogues	on	Metaphysics	(Dialogue	7,	XI),	the	first	law	of	motion	was	justified	on	the	grounds	that	the	straight	line	is	the	simplest	and	shortest	line.	When	it	comes	to	the	second	law,	he	noted	that	though	there	is	change	of	direction,	there	is	conservation	of	the	“quantity	of	the	moving	force”	(1923,	191).	These	two	principles	constitute	“the	general	laws	of	the	communication	of	movements	in	accordance	with	which	God	acts	incessantly”	(op.cit)	(cf.	also	
Researche,	Elucidation	XV;	1997,	664).		 Malebranchean	laws	of	nature	are	“efficacious”;10	in	particular,	it	is	because	of	the	efficacy	of	the	second	law	(governing	impact)	that	diversity	in	matter	is	produced:	the	diversity	there	is	in	matter	is	counterfactually	dependent	on	the	second	law	of	motion.	But	more	than	this,	both	laws	are	the	cause	of	all	motion:	“These	two	laws	are	the	cause	of	all	the	motions	which	cause	that	variety	of																																																									10	As	Robert	Merrihew	Adams	(2013,	75)	aptly	put	it,	Malebranchean	laws	“have	‘oomph’”.	
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forms	which	we	admire	in	nature”	(TNG,	XV;	1992,	115).	They	are	“necessary	to	the	production	and	the	preservation	of	the	earth,	and	of	all	the	stars	that	are	in	the	heavens”	(op.cit.).	Whatever	happens	in	nature	(barring	God’s	miraculous	intervention)	is	the	necessary	consequence	of	the	laws	of	motion.		But	how	are	laws	executed	by	matter?	For	Malebranche,	they	are	not!	God	himself	executes	the	laws.	The	laws	are	the	divine	decrees	themselves,	which	ground	the	regularity.	The	laws	are	principles	of	connection	(“indissoluble	bonds	of	union”)	between	natural	things	(distinct	existences).	As	he	put	it	in	Dialogue	7,	XIII	(1923,	195):	“the	divine	decrees	are	the	indissoluble	bonds	of	union	between	the	various	parts	of	the	universe	and	of	the	marvelous	network	of	all	the	subordinate	causes”.		As	Malebranche	stressed,	the	two	basic	principles	of	what	came	to	be	known	as	occasionalism	are	these:		1. Bodies	lack	motor	force.	2. God	acts	on	nature	via	general	laws.	Here	is	how	he	put	it:			 these	two	principles,	of	which	I	am	convinced,	that	none	but	the	Creator	of	bodies	can	be	their	mover,	and	that	God	communicates	His	power	to	us	only	through	the	establishment	of	certain	general	laws,	the	realisation	of	which	we	determine	through	our	various	modifications	(Dialogues,	7,	XIV;	1923,	196).		Since	matter	is	impotent	to	execute	the	laws,	they	must	be	‘executed’	by	God;	yet,	as	is	explicitly	stated	in	the	foregoing	passage,	the	laws	are	‘realised’	in	various	natural	(i.e.,	occasional)	causes	(via	their	modifications).	In	this	scheme,	there	is	no	room	for	connecting	entities	like	powers/active	qualities.	The	link	between	God	(as	the	only	power)	and	the	regularity	there	is	in	nature	is	laws—that	is	God’s	decrees	which	are	directly	realised	in	natural	bodies	and	their	motions	(cf.	Dialogues	7,	XIII;	1923,	195).	Hence,	laws	being	the	“indissoluble	bonds	of	union	between	the	various	parts	of	the	universe”	are	executed	by	God	and	are	realised	in	natural	bodies	and	their	regular	behaviour.			 How	are	laws	executed	by	God?	When	He	re-creates	a	body	in	motion,	He	makes	it	move	always	in	a	straight	line	according	to	the	first	law,	i.e.,	the	subsequent	re-creations	should	be	in	accordance	to	the	first	law.	This	is	God’s	general	volition.	But	there	are	collisions.	Again,	the	law	of	collisions	determines	that	the	re-created	bodies	will	be	such	that	there	is	a	certain	re-distribution	of	motion	among	them.	In	a	collision	between	body	X	and	body	Y,	X	is	not	the	cause	of	the	motion	of	Y.	X	communicates	“nothing	of	its	own”	to	Y.	Yet,	there	is	a	law-governed	re-distribution	of	motion	between	X	and	Y.	God	acts	according	to	a	law	which	causes	the	re-distribution	of	motion.	Hence	though	all	communications	of	motion	are	executed	by	God,	they	are	executed	by	a	general	law.	The	action	of	natural	causes	consists	“only	in	the	motor	force	activating	them”,	i.e.,	God	(Researche,	Elucidation	XV;	1997,	662).	Does	that	mean	that	God	communicates	his	power	to	bodies?	Not	quite!	God	has	made	the	modifications	of	bodies	the	occasional	causes	of	his	action—which	is	law-governed	(cf.	1997,	225).	There	is	an	ongoing	debate	among	Malebranche’s	scholars	about	the	content	of	laws	of	nature—are	they	general	volitions	or	(sums	of)	particular	volitions?11																																																									11	See	Pessin	2001;	Ott	2009,	chapter	11;	Nadler	2011;	Robert	Merrihew	Adams	2013	for	a	representative	sample.	
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As	Malebranche	explains,	when	God	acts	with	a	particular	volition,	he	acts	
without	the	occasional	cause,	e.g.,	when	I	feel	pain	without	being	pricked	by	a	pin.	Or	when	a	body	“begins	to	move	itself	without	being	struck	by	another,	or	without	any	change	in	the	will	of	minds,	or	in	any	other	creature	that	determines	the	efficacy	of	some	general	laws,	I	say	then	that	God	moves	this	body	by	a	particular	will”	(TNG,	Illustration	II;	1992,	195).	But	what	happens	when	a	ball	strikes	another?	How	does	God	act?	Malebranche’s	answer	is	that	God	moves	the	second	ball	by	a	general	volition	(a	general	law).	The	ball	is	moved	“in	consequence	of	the	general	and	efficacious	laws	of	the	communication”	(cf.	also	TNG,	Illustration	I;	1992,	195).	So	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	Malebranchean	laws	are	general	volitions.		Malebranchean	laws	of	nature	are	not	metaphysically	necessary.	But	are	they	contingent?	They	are	not.	As	we	have	seen,	God	submits	himself	to	laws	not	out	of	absolute	necessity	but	out	of	his	will	for	the	good.	Malebranche	also	stresses	that,	to	put	it	in	modern	jargon,	regularity	does	not	imply	causation;	necessity	is	also	needed.	Hence,	“Only	in	the	wisdom	of	God	do	we	see	eternal,	immutable,	and	necessary	truths.	Nowhere	else	but	in	this	wisdom	do	we	see	the	order	that	God	Himself	is	constrained	to	follow	(Recherche;	Elucidation	10;	1997,	615-6).	In	a	famous	passage	in	his	La	recherché	de	la	verite,	Malebranche	makes	clear	that	we	can	conceive	of	absolute	(metaphysical)	necessity	only	between	the	will	of	God	and	something	happening	because	of	this:		 A	true	cause	as	I	understand	it	is	one	such	that	the	mind	perceives	a	necessary	connection	between	it	and	its	effect.	Now	the	mind	perceives	a	necessary	connection	between	the	will	of	an	infinite	being	and	its	effect.	Therefore,	it	is	only	God	who	is	the	true	cause	and	who	truly	has	the	power	to	move	bodies	(1997,	450).					 Since	there	is	no	perception	by	the	mind	of	necessary	connections	between	natural	(or	occasional)	causes	and	natural	(or	occasional)	effects,	these	are	not	
real	causes.	For	any	natural	cause,	it	is	conceivable	without	contradiction	that	it	can	occur	without	its	effect.	And	of	course,	God	can	make	it	happen	that	that	it	does	occur	without	its	(natural)	effect.	Only	in	the	case	of	God’s	will	is	it	impossible	for	us	to	conceive	of	it	without	at	the	same	time	conceiving	whatever	it	wills	to	happen.	But,	barring	miraculous	interventions,	natural	causes	invariably	precede	their	natural	effects	in	virtue	of	God’s	general	volitions,	aka	laws	of	nature.	Hence,	the	regularity	there	is	in	nature	(in	virtue	of	which	it	is	predictable	and	knowable)	is	grounded	in	(in	the	sense	of	being	the	effect	of)	the	laws	of	nature.	The	law	is	not	the	regularity	itself,	but	it	is	the	principle	(God’s	general	volition)	which	grounds	the	regularity.			 The	occasional	cause	does	not	act—though	it	might	seem	to	us	that	it	does.	It	is	the	law	that	is	causally	efficacious:	“A	body	moves	immediately	after	having	been	struck:	the	collision	of	the	bodies	is	the	action	of	the	occasional	cause;	thus	this	body	moves	by	a	general	will”	(op.cit.).	Occasional	causes	and	the	concomitant	regularity	is	a	sign	that	the	effect	does	not	have	“something	singular	about	it”.	Hence,	the	presence	of	an	occasional	cause	is	sign	(“mark”)	that	there	is	action	by	the	general	volition	of	God	(Illustration	VIII).	Hence,	regularity	(occasional	‘causation’)	is	a	‘mark’	for	the	presence	of	a	law	by	means	of	which	God	acts.	Being	the	decrees	of	God,	laws	hold	with	some	kind	of	necessity.	Recall	the	very	title	of	Malebranche’s	Treatise:	On	the	Necessity	of	General	Laws	of	Nature.	
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What	kind	of	necessity	is	this?	It	is	natural	or	hypothetical	necessity.	Even	though	the	natural	necessity	of	the	laws	cannot	possibly	be	rationally	inferred	from	the	observation	of	the	invariable	conjunction	of	natural	causes	and	natural	effects,	it	can	be	conceived	if	we	reflect	on	the	way	God	acts.	The	laws	of	nature	are	certainly	part	of	the	fabric	of	nature;	hence,	there	is	necessity	in	nature;	though	this	necessity	is	not	located	or	grounded	in	bodies	“by	themselves”;	nor	can	it	inferred	by	experience	and	from	the	regularity	there	is	in	nature.12				 	
5.	Berkeley	on	Laws	That	laws	are	naturally	necessary	is	a	view	that,	perhaps	surprisingly,	can	be	attributed	to	Berkeley	too.	For	Berkeley,	all	causation	is	an	action	of	the	will	of	a	spirit.	Hence,	only	God	and	minds	(spirits)	can	be	(efficient)	causes.	Ideas	are	passive	and	inert	(Principles	§25;	2008,	92).	Though	it	is	false	to	claim	that	ideas	are	the	“effects	of	powers	resulting	from	the	configuration,	number,	motion,	and	size	of	corpuscles”,	ideas	must	nonetheless	have	a	cause	“whereon	they	depend,	and	which	produces	and	changes	them”	(Principles	§26;	2008,	92).	These	can	only	be	incorporeal	substances	(i.e.,	minds	qua	active	substances).		God	excites	(and	causes)	ideas	in	us	by	means	of	laws	of	nature.	This	claim	is	grounded	in	the	fact	that	ideas	have	“admirable	connexions”	and	regularity;	they	come	“in	a	regular	train	or	series”	(Principles	§30).	So	the	order	and	regularity	in	the	co-occurrence	and	succession	of	ideas	suggest	that	they	are	caused	in	us	by	a	Will	which	acts	in	an	orderly	and	regular	way.	As	Berkeley	put	it:	“The	set	of	rules	or	established	methods,	wherein	the	mind	we	depend	on	excites	in	us	the	ideas	of	sense,	are	called	the	‘laws	of	nature’;	and	these	we	learn	by	experience,	which	teaches	us	that	such	and	such	ideas	are	attended	with	such	and	such	other	ideas	in	the	ordinary	course	of	things”	(Principles	§30;	2008,	94).		Laws	of	nature	stem	from	God’s	Will.	They	are	expressions	of	God’s	Will	to	act	in	a	regular	way:	“(T)his	consistent	uniform	working,	which	so	evidently	displays	the	goodness	and	wisdom	of	that	governing	spirit	whose	will	constitutes	the	laws	of	nature”	(§32;	2008,	94).	But	unlike	all	of	his	predecessors,	Berkeley	took	it	that	laws	of	nature	are	known	by	observation	and	empirical	study.	They	are	not	known	a	priori.	They	are	not	inferred	by	reference	to	the	simplicity	of	God’s	actions	or	his	immutability.	They	do	reflect	his	goodness	and	wisdom	in	creating	the	world,	but	they	can	only	be	known	a	posteriori.	In	particular,	laws	are	not	discovered	a	priori	by	looking	for	“necessary	connections	among	ideas”.	There	is	nothing	in	the	idea	of	fire	that	necessarily	implies	that	it	warms	us.		The	regularity	there	is	in	the	world	is	discovered	empirically	“only	by	the	observation	of	the	settled	laws	of	nature”	(§31;	2008,	94).	Thanks	to	the	laws	of	nature,	ideas	are	connected	to	each	other	(e.g.,	the	idea	of	fire	and	the	idea	that	it	warms	us)	even	though	one	may	be	conceived	without	the	other	without	falling	into	contradiction.	 	 In	a	certain	sense,	Berkeley	pushed	the	case	for	occasionalism	to	its	extremes.	Malebranchean	occasionalism	kept	matter	but	divested	it	from	any	causal	power	or	efficacy.	Hence,	there	are	no	corporeal	causes.	Without	naming	it,	Berkeley	(Principles	§53)	noted	that	occasionalism	got	it	right	in	claiming	that	“amongst																																																									12	Here	I	am	in	essential	agreement	with	Robert	Adams	who	stresses	that	for	Malebranche	there	is	necessitation	in	causation	in	the	following	sense:	occasional	causes	are	“part	of	how	God’s	general	volitions,	as	efficacious	laws	of	nature,	necessitate	particular	effects”	(2013,	77).	
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all	the	objects	of	sense,	there	was	none	which	had	any	power	or	activity	included	in	it,	and	that	by	consequence	this	was	likewise	true	of	whatever	bodies	they	supposed	to	exist	without	the	mind”	(2008,	103).	But	he	thought	that	the	further	supposition,	viz.,	that	there	is	“an	innumerable	multitude	of	created	beings,	which	(…)	are	not	capable	of	producing	any	one	effect	in	nature”	is	“unaccountable	and	extravagant”,	though	possible.		 If	Berkeley	found	in	occasionalism	no	argument	for	the	philosophical	category	
of	mater,	he	found	in	it	an	understanding	of	how	God	acts	in	the	world:	via	laws	of	nature.	In	this	sense,	laws	of	nature	are	key	to	Berkeley’s	natural	philosophy.	As	he	put	it	(Principles	§62;	2008,	107):			 There	are	certain	general	laws	that	run	through	the	whole	chain	of	natural	effects.	These	are	learned	by	the	observation	and	study	of	nature,	and	are	by	men	applied	as	well	to	the	framing	artificial	things	for	the	use	and	ornament	of	life	as	to	the	explaining	the	various	phenomena:	which	explication	consists	only	in	showing	the	conformity	any	particular	phenomenon	has	to	the	general	laws	of	nature	or,	which	is	the	same	thing,	in	discovering	the	uniformity	there	is	in	the	production	of	natural	effects,	as	will	be	evident	to	whoever	shall	attend	to	the	several	instances,	wherein	philosophers	pretend	to	account	for	appearances.			This	rich	passage	suggests	the	following	about	laws:		a) Laws	“run	through”	the	whole	chain	of	natural	effects.	Hence,	laws	cover	all	natural	effects	(the	whole	chain	of	events	in	nature).	This	covering	should	not	be	seen	as	‘governing’	but	as	‘running	through’—laws	‘permeate’	natural	phenomena;	the	imbue	natural	phenomena.		b) These	laws,	as	noted	already,	are	discovered	a	posteriori;	they	are	learned	by	observation	and	empirical	study	of	nature.	c) Explanation	in	natural	philosophy	is	showing	that	particular	phenomena	conform	to	a	general	law;	that	is,	that	they	are	‘permeated’	by	a	law.	Hence,	explanation	can	be	seen	as	nomological	subsumption.	d) The	‘production’	of	natural	effects	is	nothing	more	than	their	law-based	explanation—that	is,	their	permeation	by	laws.			 God	acts	via	laws	at	all	levels.	And	because	of	this,	he	produces	(literally	this	time,	since	He’s	an	efficient	cause)	any	effect	“according	to	the	standing	mechanical	laws	of	nature”	(op.cit.).	As	Berkeley	repeatedly	stresses,	this	is	not	a	necessary	truth—it	is	not	“absolutely	necessary”	for	God	to	produce	any	effect	by	mechanical	principles.	Yet,	the	metaphysical	contingency	of	the	‘clockwork	of	nature’	does	not	detract	from	the	fact	that	God	wills	to	act	“agreeably	to	the	rules	of	mechanism”.	In	fact,	given	that	Berkeley	does	want	to	accommodate	mechanism	(the	clockwork	of	nature)	within	his	philosophy,	he	further	argues	that	although	God	could	produce	anything	he	wanted	without	any	mechanism,	the	‘clockwork	of	nature’	is	the	way	God	has	chosen	to	produce	effects	in	nature	in	a	regular	and	orderly	way.	Hence,	the	mechanical	laws	of	nature	are	
conditionally	or	naturally	necessary,	viz.	necessary	“to	the	producing	[of	an	effect]	according	to	the	standing	mechanical	laws	of	nature”.			 In	De	Motu,	in	which	Berkeley	makes	an	attempt	to	explain	his	natural	philosophy	without	explicitly	denying	that	there	is	matter,	he	expresses	his	firm	view	that	“(R)egarding	body	we	may	boldly	declare	as	established	fact	that	it	is	not	the	principle	of	motion”	(2008,	250).	He	adds	that	what	we	know	about	the	
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body	(what	is	contained	in	the	idea	of	body—“extension,	solidity,	and	figure”)	is	not	a	principle	of	motion.	And	in	§24	he	dismisses	that	there	might	be	something	unknown	in	body	which	is	this	principle	of	motion,	because	we	have	no	idea	of	it.		Laws	of	nature,	then,	‘replace’	internal	principles	of	motion	of	bodies.	In	science	it	is	enough	to	state	true	theorems	about	the	motion	of	the	bodies,	irrespective	of	what	might	or	might	not	cause	these	motions.	These	true	theorems	are	“the	rules	and	laws	of	motion”	and	the	“theorems	deduced	from	them”,	(regulis	&	legibus	motuum,	simul	ac	theoremata	inde	deducta).	And	these	laws	“remain	unshaken,	so	long	as	sensible	effects	and	reasoning	based	on	them	are	granted”	(2008,	252).	There	is	little	doubt,	however,	that	even	though	laws	are	discoverable	a	posteriori,	they	hold	with	natural	necessity	and	permeate	the	actual	behaviour	of	things.		
	
6.	Leibniz	on	Laws	and	Powers	Malebranche	did	adopt	the	principle	of	the	conservation	of	total	quantity	of	motion.	In	Dialogue	X,	(1923,	267),	he	noted:	“In	a	word,	God	has	chosen	the	simplest	law	on	the	basis	of	the	unique	principle	that	the	stronger	shall	conquer	the	weaker;	and,	subject	to	this	condition,	that	there	shall	always	be	in	the	world	the	same	quantity	of	motion”.	But	he	never	followed	the	Cartesian	course	of	trying	to	ground	the	laws	of	motion	on	this	principle	and	the	immutability	of	God.	He	did	attribute	“moving	force”	to	God	and	claimed	that	God	acts	“always	with	the	same	efficacy	or	the	same	quantity	of	moving	force”	(Dialogue	7;	1923,	191).	The	total	quantity	of	moving	force	is	conserved,	since	as	Malebranche	put	it,	God	“never	changes	the	quantity	of	the	moving	force	which	animates	matter”	(op.cit).		 As	is	well	known,	a	principled	disagreement	between	the	Cartesians	and	Leibniz	concerned	what	exactly	is	conserved	during	impact.	Already	in	1686,	Leibniz	noted	that	there	is	a	great	difference	between	the	concept	of	the	quantity	of	motion	and	the	concept	of	quantity	of	motive	force	and	that	Descartes	was	mistaken	in	holding	them	to	be	equivalent.	This	mistake	led	Descartes,	Leibniz	argued,	to	“to	assert	that	God	conserves	the	same	quantity	of	motion	in	the	world”	(1989,	296).	But	this	basic	Cartesian	principle	PCQM	was	not	correct,	as	Leibniz	conclusively	demonstrated.	What	is	conserved	is	the	total	quantity	of	vis	
viva,	which	is	the	product	of	mass	times	the	square	of	the	velocity	of	a	body.	As	Leibniz	put	it,	what	is	conserved	is	the	“total	force	and	the	total	direction”.	We	will	not	go	into	the	details	of	this	presently.	What	is	important	for	our	purposes	is	that	Leibniz	presents	this	principle—the	conservation	of	the	quantity	of	force—as	a	subordinate	law	of	nature	(Discourse	on	Metaphysics,	§17).			 The	fundamental	law	of	nature	is	a	law	of	order.	The	world	is	orderly	and	regular	and	for	Leibniz	“no	matter	how	God	might	have	created	the	world,	it	would	always	have	been	regular	and	in	a	certain	general	Order”	(Discourse	§6;	1989,	306).	Hence,	this	fundamental	law	is	metaphysically	necessary.	But	the	most	orderly	world	could	have	been	the	most	complex	one.	Leibniz	notes	that	God	chose	to	create	the	most	perfect	world,	where	perfection	is	a	function	of	two	factors—simplicity	and	strength.	As	he	put	it:	“But	God	has	chosen	that	world	which	is	the	most	perfect,	that	is	to	say,	which	is	at	the	same	time	the	simplest	in	its	hypotheses	and	the	richest	in	phenomena”	(op.cit.).	So	the	simplest	world	is	at	the	same	time	the	most	comprehensive	world.			 This	world	is	structured	by	subordinate	laws.	These	are	God’s	general	
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volitions.	They	govern	everything	without	exceptions:	“For	the	most	general	of	God’s	laws,	which	rules	the	whole	sequence	of	the	universe,	is	without	exception”	(Discourse	§7;	1989,	307).	The	law	of	the	conservation	of	the	quantity	of	force	is	the	chief	subordinate	law	of	nature.	It	is	grounded	directly	in	God	in	that	it	is	God	who	“always	conserves	by	rule	the	same	force”	(Discourse	§17;	1989,	314).	Elsewhere	(1989,	499),	he	calls	the	Law	of	conservation	of	quantity	of	force	“the	foundation	of	the	laws	of	nature”	implying	that	among	the	subordinate	laws	there	is	a	hierarchy	of	laws,	with	PCQF	being	at	the	bottom.			 But	what	is	force	or	active	power?	Leibniz	takes	it	to	be	a	non-mechanical	quality,	which	is	necessary	for	explaining	the	behaviour	of	things.	It	is	non-mechanical	in	the	sense	that	it	is	not	one	of	the	basic	mechanical	categories	of	Cartesianism,	viz.,	extension,	figure	and	motion.	It’s	not	geometrical	and	it	is	attributed	to	natural	bodies	over	and	above	their	mechanical	affections.	In	fact,	given	that	the	basic	law	of	nature	is	the	conservation	of	the	quantity	of	force,	Leibniz	argues	that	in	finding	the	“true	laws	of	nature	and	the	rules	of	motion”,	we	have	to	go	beyond	mechanics	and	physics	to	metaphysics	(Discourse	§18;	1989,	315).	We	have	to	ascertain	the	forces	(that	is	the	“immediate	causes”	of	motions	and	changes	in	nature).	Forces	are	“more	real”	than	their	effects	(changes	in	motion)	and	because	forces	are	“different	from	size,	figure,	and	motion”,	we	can	conclude	that	“not	everything	which	is	conceived	in	a	body	consists	solely	in	extension	and	its	modifications”	(op.cit.).	Leibniz	took	the	need	to	appeal	to	forces	to	vindicate	the	medieval-Aristotelian	view	that	bodies	have	active	and	passive	powers,	which	are	not	mechanically	explicable	and	grounded.	Rather,	they	“pertain	to	certain	forms	or	indivisible	natures”	of	corporeal	substances	(op.cit.).	The	key	characteristic	of	forces,	which	are	directly	“implanted”	to	corporeal	bodies	“by	the	Creator”,	is	that	by	being	subjected	to	forces,	bodies	are	endowed	“with	conatus,	attaining	[their]	full	effect	unless	[they	are]	impeded	by	a	contrary	conatus”	(1989,	440).	This	force	is	in	the	“bodies	themselves”	and	“it	constitute(s)	the	inmost	nature	of	the	body,	since	it	is	the	character	of	substance	to	act”	(1989,	435).		Restoring	forces	or	powers	as	being	inherent	in	bodies	was	an	important	break	with	Cartesianism.	Matter	is	not	passive	but	active.	But	Leibniz	adopted	the	idea	that	the	motions	of	pieces	of	matter	is	subject	to	natural	laws,	which	are	established	by	God.	Though	not	metaphysically	necessary,	the	laws	are	far	from	“arbitrary”.	God	has	chosen	them	but	as	Leibniz	put	it,	“God	has	been	led	to	set	in	motion	the	laws	which	are	observed	in	nature	through	determined	principles	of	wisdom	and	by	reasons	of	order”	(1989,	500).	In	this	sense,	we	can	say	that	laws	of	nature	are	conditionally	or	naturally	necessary	in	that	given	God’s	demand	for	simplicity	and	strength	(i.e.,	perfection)	in	an	orderly	world,	these	particular	laws	had	to	be	chosen.	In	a	letter	to	Malebranche	(June22/July	2	1679),	he	put	this	point	thus:	“We	must	also	say	that	God	makes	the	maximum	of	things	he	can,	and	what	obliges	him	to	seek	simple	laws	is	precisely	the	necessity	to	find	place	for	as	many	things	as	can	be	put	together;	if	he	made	use	of	other	laws,	it	would	be	like	trying	to	make	a	building	with	round	stones,	which	make	us	lose	more	space	than	they	occupy”	(1989,	211).	His	general	reaction	to	occasionalism	reveals	his	views	about	the	relation	between	law	and	power.	His	chief	point	is	that	though	occasionalists	are	right	in	denying	that	there	is	interaction	among	bodies,	and	in	particular,	in	denying	the	direct	influx	theory	according	to	which	a	cause	is	what	flows	into	the	effect	
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(hence	that	something	flows	between	two	distinct	substances),	they	are	wrong	in	placing	all	action	in	God,	thereby	turning	him	into	a	Deus	ex	Machina.	Occasionalism,	for	Leibniz,	introduces	“a	kind	of	continuous	miracle”	(1989,	338).	It	is	“as	if	God	as	a	rule	interfered	in	some	other	way	than	by	preserving	each	substance	in	its	course	and	in	the	laws	established	for	it”	(op.cit.).	Though	his	diagnosis	of	how	God	acts	according	to	occasionalism	might	well	be	wrong,	since	for	Malebranche	at	least	God	need	not	act	by	anything	other	than	his	general	volition,	Leibniz	points	to	a	genuine	problem	with	occasionalism,	viz.,	that	laws	are	executed	directly	by	God	himself	and	not	by	natural	bodies.	So	Leibniz	took	it	that	a	complete	understanding	of	the	workings	of	nature	requires	both	laws	of	nature	and	powerful	substances.	He	identified	a	key	problem	for	both	Cartesianism	and	occasionalism.	I	call	it	Leibniz’s	problem:	How	can	passive	matter	‘obey’	laws?	How	are	laws	executed	if	matter	does	not	have	what	it	takes	the	execute	them?		In	his	reply	to	Bayle’s	criticism	in	1698,	Leibniz	stressed	that	even	though	general	laws	are	decrees	of	God,	they	are	in	need	“of	a	natural	means	of	carrying	[them]	out”;	hence,	“all	that	happens	must	also	be	explained	through	the	nature	which	God	gives	to	things”	(1989,	494).	In	his	‘On	the	Nature	itself,	or	on	the	Inherent	Force	and	Actions	of	Created	Things”,	(1698),	Leibniz	gave	the	following	argument	for	the	need	to	make	bodies	powerful	and	causally	efficacious.	Laws	are	certainly	God’s	decrees;	but	for	bodies	to	be	able	to	execute	the	laws	in	the	future,	something	must	have	been	“impressed	upon	creatures”	by	God	which	makes	them	capable	to	act	according	to	the	law.		For	otherwise	there	are	no	necessary	connections	between	causes	and	effects;	the	command	(God’s	law)	is	either	not	binding	at	future	moments	or	“it	must	always	be	renewed	in	the	future”.	The	command	(the	law),	which	was	set	in	the	beginning	of	time,	is	binding	now	and	in	the	future	only	if	“the	law	set	up	by	God	does	in	fact	leave	some	vestige	of	him	expressed	in	Things”.	And	this	implies	that	“there	is	a	certain	efficacy	residing	in	things”;	(and	creatures	in	general).	It	is	this	efficacy	which	makes	them	“capable	of	fulfilling	the	will	of	him	who	commanded	them”.	This	efficacy	is	part	of	their	nature	and	it’s	a	force	“from	which	the	series	of	phenomena	follows	according	to	the	prescription	of	the	first	command”	(cf.	1989,	501).		Leibniz’s	argument	implies	that	both	laws	and	inherent	powers	are	required	for	the	explanation	of	natural	phenomena.	But	powers	are	individuated	independently	of	laws;	they	are	presupposed	for	the	existence	of	necessary	connections	in	nature	in	the	sense	that	powers	are	required	for	things	to	obey	laws	and	for	the	laws	to	be	binding.	In	his	letter	to	Hartsoeker	(Hanover,	10	February	1711),	Leibniz	makes	clear	that	it	is	not	enough	for	the	identification	of	a	power	to	state	a	law	that	it	obeys	(or	simply	that	there	is	law);	what	is	also	required	is	the	specification	of	the	mechanism	by	means	of	which	this	power	acts.	The	mechanism	is,	clearly,	on	top	of	the	law	and	given	independently	of	it.	Without	the	mechanism	the	power	is	“an	unreasonable	occult	quality”.	He	says:			 Thus	the	ancients	and	the	moderns,	who	own	that	gravity	is	an	occult	quality,	are	in	the	right,	if	they	mean	by	it	that	there	is	a	certain	mechanism	unknown	to	them,	whereby	all	bodies	tend	towards	the	center	of	the	earth.	But	if	they	mean	that	the	thing	is	performed	without	any	mechanism	by	a	simple	primitive	quality,	or	by	a	law	of	God,	who	produces	that	effect	without	using	any	intelligible	means,	it	is	an	unreasonable	occult	quality,	and	so	
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very	occult,	that	it	is	impossible	it	should	ever	be	clear,	though	an	angel,	or	God	himself,	should	undertake	to	explain	it	(in	Newton	2004,	112).		The	bottom	line	is	that	qua	divine	commands,	laws	are	binding	only	if	bodies	are	capable	of	following	them	necessarily—and	this	is	grounded	in	their	“impressed	nature”.	Fundamentally,	their	impressed	nature	(“the	substance	of	things	itself”,	as	Leibniz	put	it),	“consists	in	the	force	of	acting	and	being	acted	upon”	(1989,	502).	This	is	“a	primitive	motive	force”,	which	is	“superadded”	to	extension	and	mass	and	grounds	motion	and	action.	For	reason	which	we	cannot	go	into	here,	Leibniz	identifies	this	primitive	force	with	a	soul	or	substantial	form.		
	
7.	Hume	and	Newton	on	Laws	and	Necessity	Recently,	there	has	been	considerable	controversy	about	what	Hume	thought	about	necessity.	The	trend	is	to	interpret	his	a	sceptical	realist,	while	the	traditional	view	was	that	he	was	a	denialist.	For	reasons	that	I	cannot	go	into	now,	I	think	that	the	traditional	view	is	essentially	correct:	Hume	denied	that	there	is	any	power	in	nature;	hence	he	denied	that	there	is	any	necessity	in	nature	(see	my	2003,	chapter	1	for	a	discussion).	Hume	did	not	deny	that	there	are	laws	of	nature.	However,	these	laws	do	not	govern;	nor	is	it	the	case	that	worldly	things	obey	them,	in	any	interesting	sense.	Laws	are	just	the	regularities	themselves	and	nothing	more.	Reflecting	on	the	question	of	necessity	that	the	laws	of	motion	allegedly	have,	Hume	said:			 The	degree	and	direction	of	every	motion	is,	by	the	laws	of	nature,	prescribed	with	such	exactness,	that	a	living	creature	may	as	soon	arise	from	the	shock	of	two	bodies,	as	motion,	in	any	other	degree	or	direction	than	what	is	actually	produced	by	it.	Would	we,	therefore,	form	a	just	and	precise	idea	of	necessity,	we	must	consider	whence	that	idea	arises,	when	we	apply	it	to	the	operation	of	bodies	(Enquiry,	Section	VIII,	Part	I,	82).		The	idea	of	necessity,	which	of	course	Hume	never	doubted	that	we	possess	and	that	it	is	part	of	the	common	understanding	of	causation,	is	a	projection	of	the	human	mind	on	nature,	which	is	conditioned	by	the	existence	of	uniformity	and	regularity	on	nature:			 Our	idea,	therefore,	of	necessity	and	causation	arises	entirely	from	the	uniformity,	observable	in	the	operations	of	nature;	where	similar	objects	are	constantly	conjoined	together,	and	the	mind	is	determined	by	custom	to	infer	the	one	from	the	appearance	of	the	other.	These	two	circumstances	form	the	whole	of	that	necessity,	which	we	ascribe	to	matter.	Beyond	the	constant	conjunction	of	similar	objects,	and	the	consequent	inference	from	one	to	the	other,	we	have	no	notion	of	any	necessity,	or	connexion	(Enquiry,	Section	VIII,	Part	I,	82).	Newton’s	attitude,	which	of	course	preceded	Hume’s,	was	quite	different.13	On	my	reading	of	Newton,	there	is	power	in	nature	but	powers	and	laws	are	mutually	determined—to	introduce	a	power	is	to	introduce	a	law.	Interestingly,	Newton	did	allow	that	there	is	necessity	in	nature;	but	this	necessity	is,	from	an	empirical-scientific	point	of	view,	ineffable.		 To	substantiate	the	point	that	for	Newton	powers	and	laws	are	mutually	determined,	we	should	briefly	compare	him	with	Descartes.	In	Definition	III	of																																																									13	My	understanding	on	Newton	has	been	influenced	by	long	discussions	with	Robert	DiSalle.	
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the	Principia,	Newton	introduces	the	power	(vis)	of	matter	of	resisting	acceleration	(change	of	state	of	motion)	by	means	of	a	law.	He	says:	“Inherent	force	of	matter	(vis	insita)	is	the	power	of	resisting	by	which	every	body,	so	far	as	it	is	able	(quantum	in	se	est),	perseveres	in	its	state	either	of	resting	or	of	moving	uniformly	straight	forward”	(2004,	60).	Let’s	compare	this	with	Newton’s	first	law	of	motion:	“Every	body	perseveres	in	its	state	of	being	at	rest	or	of	moving	uniformly	straight	forward,	except	insofar	as	it	is	compelled	to	change	its	state	by	forces	impressed”	(2004,	45).	The	Definition	defines	a	power	a	body	has	intrinsically,	viz.,	the	power	to	persevere	in	its	state	of	motion	(i.e.,	the	power	to	resist	changes	in	its	state	of	motion),	by	stating	the	law	it	obeys	
quantum	in	se	est.14	In	the	statement	of	the	first	law,	on	the	other	hand,	Newton	describes	the	law	a	body	obeys	by	stating	what	happens	to	a	body	if	the	intrinsic	power	to	persevere	in	its	state	of	motion	is	the	only	one	that	is	present	and	acting.	i.e.,		if	the	body	is	quantum	in	se	est.	The	definition	has	the	direction	from	the	power	to	the	law;	the	law	has	the	direction	from	the	law	to	the	power.	A	way	to	combine	the	two	would	be	the	following:	Every	body	obeys	the	first	law	of	motion	(it	perseveres	in	its	state	of	being	at	rest	or	of	moving	uniformly	straight	forward)	if	and	only	its	vis	insita	is	the	only	power	acting	on	the	body.	In	this	sense,	a	power	is	defined	by	the	law	the	body	that	has	it	obeys;	and	conversely,	a	law	states	what	a	body	does	in	virtue	of	a	power	it	possesses.15				 Descartes,	by	contrast,	simply	stated	the	law:	“that	each	thing,	as	far	as	is	in	its	power	(quantum	in	se	est),	always	remains	in	the	same	state;	and	that	consequently,	when	it	is	once	moved,	it	always	continues	to	move”	(II,	37;	1982,	59).	In	his	case,	as	we	have	already	noted,	there	is	no	power	to	be	defined;	the	law	simply	replaces	the	power.	Intrinsically.	i.e.,	quantum	in	se	est,	the	body	obeys	the	law	(it	always	remains	in	the	same	state	of	motion).		
	 In	the	Preface	to	the	second	edition	of	the	Principia	in	1713,	which	was	written	by	Roger	Cotes	under	the	close	supervision	of	Newton,	Cotes	carefully	distinguished	Newton’s	views	from	those	of	the	Aristotelians	as	well	as	from	those	of	the	Cartesians.	The	chief	point	made	against	the	Aristotelians	was	that	they	posited	sui	generis	powers	and	this	was	redundant	and	non-explanatory.	Cotes	wrote:		 There	have	been	those	who	have	endowed	the	individual	species	of	things	with	specific	occult	qualities,	on	which	–	they	have	then	alleged	–	the	operations	of	individual	bodies	depend	in	some	unknown	way.	The	whole	of	Scholastic	doctrine	derived	from	Aristotle	and	the	Peripatetics	is	based	on	this.	Although	they	affirm	that	individual	effects	arise	from	the	specific	natures	of	bodies,	they	do	not	tell	us	the	causes	of	those	natures,	and	therefore	they	tell	us	nothing	(2004,	43).		Note	the	complaint	about	the	“unknown	way”	on	which	the	operations	of	bodies	possessing	a	certain	power	depend.	Newton’s	emphasis	on	laws	in	defining	powers	was	meant,	among	other	things,	to	capture,	and	hence	to	explain,	how	powers	act:	they	act	via	laws;	better:	to	introduce	a	power	is	to	introduce	the	law	that	things	that	possess	it	obey.	There	is	no	explanatory	gap	here.	No	unknown																																																									14	For	more	on	the	importance	of	Quantum	in	Se	Est	see	I.	Bernard	Cohen	(1964).	15	As	George	Smith	(2002,	151)	nicely	put	it:	“The	law	characterizing	a	force	from	a	physical	point	of	view	gives	its	“physical	proportions”	and	assigns	it	to	a	“physical	species.”	Two	forces	are	of	the	same	physical	species	only	if	they	are	characterised	by	the	same	law”.		
	 21	
modus	operandi.			 But	Cotes	goes	on	to	criticise	the	Cartesian	way	too.	As	is	well-known,	his	chief	point	against	the	Cartesians	in	the	preface	was	that	they	recourse	to	unfounded	hypotheses	and	speculations	about	the	mechanical	causes	of	the	phenomena.	It	transpires	however	that	Cotes’s	real	complaint	was	that	they	do	all	this	in	order	to	avoid	the	Aristotelian	pitfall	of	powers.	They	try	to	rectify	the	sui	generis	and	non-explanatory	nature	of	Aristotelian	powers	by	avoiding	powers	altogether	and	by	appealing,	instead,	to	mechanical	hypotheses	about	matter	in	motion.	Here	is	how	Cotes	puts	the	point	when	it	comes	to	what	Cartesians	say	about	gravity:		 For	either	they	will	say	that	gravity	is	not	a	property	of	all	bodies	–	which	cannot	be	maintained	–	or	they	will	assert	that	gravity	is	preternatural	on	the	grounds	that	it	does	not	arise	from	other	affections	of	bodies	and	thus	not	from	mechanical	causes.	Certainly	there	are	primary	affections	of	bodies,	and	since	they	are	primary,	they	do	not	depend	on	others	(2004,	51).		Hence,	the	price	that	the	Cartesian	way	out	comes	with	is	either	a	denial	that	gravity	is	a	universal	property	of	bodies	or	that	gravity	is	a	mysterious	property	(power)	of	things	since	it	is	not	explained	and	grounded	mechanically	(i.e.,	by	means	of	a	law-obeying	configuration	of	matter	in	motion).	When	then	Cotes	states	that	there	are	“primary	affections	of	bodies”,	and	that	being	primary,	these	affections	(gravity	being	one	of	them)	“do	not	depend	on	others”,	he	carves	out	precisely	the	middle	road	that	Newton	suggested,	viz.,	to	introduce	a	primary	affection	of	matter	which	is	neither	occult	(as	the	Aristotelians	would	have	it)	nor	mysterious	(as	the	Cartesians	would	have	it)	one	would	have	to	introduce	it	by	means	of	the	law	it	obeys,	even	if	this	law	was	not	mechanical.	I	take	it	then	that	Cotes’s	and	Newton’s	via	media	was	to	keep	both	powers	(against	the	Cartesians)	and	laws	(against	the	Aristotelians)	but	to	claim	that	they	are	introduced	hand-in-hand—especially	when	it	comes	to	the	primary	(and	hence	not-further-reducible)	powers	of	matter.				 Cotes	makes	this	point	(fairly)	clearly	when	he	talks	about	gravity	being	such	a	primary	affection:	“Among	the	primary	qualities	of	all	bodies	universally,	either	gravity	will	have	a	place,	or	extension,	mobility,	and	impenetrability	will	not.	And	the	nature	of	things	either	will	be	correctly	explained	by	the	gravity	of	bodies	or	will	not	be	correctly	explained	by	the	extension,	mobility,	and	impenetrability	of	bodies”	(2004,	50).	Gravity	is	not	an	occult	power	(even	though	we	may	not	know	its	cause)	because,	as	Newton	put	it	in	the	General	Scholium,	“it	is	enough	that	gravity	really	exists	and	acts	according	to	the	laws	that	we	have	set	forth	and	is	sufficient	to	explain	all	the	motions	of	the	heavenly	bodies	and	of	our	sea”	(2004,	92).		 Hence,	the	Newtonian	method,	as	explained	by	Cotes	is	a	via	media:	“From	certain	selected	phenomena	they	deduce	by	analysis	the	forces	of	nature	and	the	simpler	laws	of	those	forces,	from	which	they	then	give	the	constitution	of	the	rest	of	the	phenomena	by	synthesis”	(emphasis	added)	(2004,	44).		 Newton,	as	is	well	known,	did	allow	that	there	might	be	an	unknown	cause	of	gravity.	So	he	might	be	taken	to	have	allowed	that	there	might	be	ways	to	identify	powers	independently	of	the	laws	they	obey.	But	he	was	adamant	that	this	kind	of	independent	identification,	if	possible	at	all,	should	not	be	taken	as	a	requirement	for	a	legitimate	appeal	powers;	specifying	the	law	that	they	obey	is	
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enough	for	scientific	purposes.	In	an	unsent	letter	written	circa	May	1712	to	the	editor	of	the	Memoirs	of	Literature,	Newton	referred	explicitly	to	Leibniz’s	letter	to	Hartsoeker,	and	stressed	that	it	is	not	necessary	for	the	introduction	of	a	power—such	as	gravity—to	specify	anything	other	than	the	law	it	obeys;	no	extra	requirements	should	be	imposed,	and	in	particular	no	requirement	for	a	mechanical	grounding.	He	said:			 And	therefore	if	any	man	should	say	that	bodies	attract	one	another	by	a	power	whose	cause	is	unknown	to	us,	or	by	a	power	seated	in	the	frame	of	nature	by	the	will	of	God,	or	by	a	power	seated	in	a	substance	in	which	bodies	move	and	float	without	resistance	and	which	has	therefore	no	vis	inertiae	but	acts	by	other	laws	than	those	that	are	mechanical:	I	know	not	why	he	should	be	said	to	introduce	miracles	and	occult	qualities	and	fictions	into	the	world	(2004,	116).	
 	 There	is	hardly	any	need	to	relate	here	Newton’s	three	laws	of	motion.16	What’s	important	to	note	is	that	for	Newton	these	laws	were	not	metaphysically	necessary.	As	Cotes	put	it:	
	 It	is	the	province	of	true	philosophy	to	derive	the	natures	of	things	from	causes	that	truly	exist,	and	to	seek	those	laws	by	which	the	supreme	artificer	willed	to	establish	this	most	beautiful	order	of	the	world,	not	those	laws	by	which	he	could	have,	had	it	so	pleased	him	(2004,	52).		There	is	little	doubt	that	laws	required	a	law-maker	and	this	was	God.	But,	for	Newton,	significantly	and	unlike	Descartes,	God	could	have	established	different	laws.	Hence,	the	laws	are	metaphysically	contingent;	they	could	be	different	from	what	they	are.		The	task	then	of	natural	philosophy	is	to	discover	the	actual	laws	of	nature—the	ones	God	did	establish.	The	key	point	here	is	that	since	God	could	have	established	other	laws,	finding	the	actual	laws	cannot	a	matter	of	a	priori	theorising	(as	Descartes	suggested)	but	of	a	broadly	empirical	investigation.	Indeed,	Cotes	says:			 From	this	source	[God’s	perfectly	free	will],	then,	have	all	the	laws	that	are	called	laws	of	nature	come,	in	which	many	traces	of	the	highest	wisdom	and	counsel	certainly	appear,	but	no	traces	of	necessity.	Accordingly	we	should	not	seek	these	laws	by	using	untrustworthy	conjectures,	but	learn	them	by	observing	and	experimenting	(2004,	57).		How	can	it	be	that	there	are	no	traces	of	necessity	in	the	laws	of	nature?	If	laws	were	metaphysically	necessary	there	would	be	known	a	priori;	hence	independently	of	experience.	But	for	Newton	and	Cotes	there	cannot	be	a	priori	knowledge	of	laws	of	nature,	since	the	laws	are	free	choices	of	God.	And	if	laws	where	metaphysically	necessary	they	would	not	the	free	choice	of	God.	Hence	there	is	a	dilemma:	either	the	claim	is	that	laws	hold	with	metaphysical	necessity,	but	then	this	would	not	make	the	laws	the	free	choice	of	the	author	of	the	universe;	or	the	claim	is	that	God	was	free	in	the	choice	of	laws,	but	then	they	cannot	be	known	a	priori.	The	first	horn	is	taken	by	Descartes;	the	second	by	Newton.	Cotes	puts	the	point	thus:	
		 He	who	is	confident	that	he	can	truly	find	the	principles	of	physics,	and	the	laws	of	things,																																																									16	For	some	insightful	points	concerning	mathematical	and	physical	characterisations	of	forces	by	Newton,	see	Janiak	(2007).	The	relevant	literature	is,	of	course,	vast.	
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by	relying	only	on	the	force	of	his	mind	and	the	internal	light	of	his	reason	should	maintain	either	that	the	world	has	existed	from	necessity	and	follows	the	said	laws	from	the	same	necessity,	or	that	although	the	order	of	nature	was	constituted	by	the	will	of	God,	nevertheless	a	creature	as	small	and	insignificant	as	he	is	has	a	clear	understanding	of	the	way	things	should	be	(2004,	57).		Part	of	the	point	is	that	knowing	the	laws	of	nature	a	priori	would	be	possible	only	on	two	conditions:	either	if	there	could	be	only	one	way	the	laws	could	be;	and	hence	the	laws	were	metaphysically	necessary;	or,	should	the	laws	be	metaphysically	contingent,	if	the	human	mind	had	the	capacity	to	latch	onto	them	independently	of	experience.	Both	conditions	are	denied	by	Newton.	So	to	the	question:		‘What	makes	the	laws	laws,	ultimately?’	Newton’s	answer	is:	the	will	of	God.	Given	that	the	laws	are	grounded	directly	in	the	will	of	God,	they	cannot	but	be	in	some	sense	necessary:	once	God	wills	them,	they	cannot	but	hold	and	govern	the	behaviour	of	things.	Buy	this	is	not	metaphysical	necessity	but	conditional	or	natural	necessity.	In	this	sense,	for	Newton	there	are	naturally	necessary	connections	in	nature,	expressed	by	the	fundamental	laws	of	nature,	but	the	only	way	to	find	them	out	is	empirically	(and	hence	fallibly).	Newton	then,	unlike	Hume,	takes	it	to	be	the	case	that	laws	are	not	mere	regularities;	however,	he	takes	it	that	they	can	be	known	only	as	(mathematically	characterised)	regularities.	This	leads	to	a	drastic	reconceptualisation	of	laws	of	nature	as	primarily	mathematical	principles	which	characterise	the	basic	structure	of	the	world	and	place	constraints	on	the	explanation	and	description	of	natural	processes,	but	are	known	empirically	and	not	a	priori.	In	his	unsent	letter	to	Cotes,	in	March	1713,	Newton	noted:		 I	like	your	design	of	adding	something	more	particularly	concerning	the	manner	of	philosophizing	made	use	of	in	the	Principia	and	wherein	it	differs	from	the	method	of	others,	viz.	by	deducing	things	mathematically	from	principles	derived	from	phenomena	by	induction.	These	principles	are	the	three	laws	of	motion.	And	these	laws	in	being	deduced	from	phenomena	by	induction	and	backed	with	reason	and	the	three	general	rules	of	philosophizing	are	distinguished	from	hypotheses	and	considered	as	axioms.	Upon	these	are	founded	all	the	propositions	in	the	first	and	second	book.	And	these	propositions	are	in	the	third	book	applied	to	the	motions	of	the	heavenly	bodies	(2004,	109-110).	
	
8.	Concluding	thoughts	During	the	seventeenth	century,	there	is	a	clear	shift	from	powers	as	regularity	enforcers	to	laws	as	regularity-enforcers.	Medieval	powers	yielded	a	bottom-up	necessity:	laws	were	metaphors	for	naturally	necessary	connections	among	powerful	substances.	But	during	the	seventeenth	century,	laws	replaced	natural	powers	as	principles	of	connection.	Laws	yield	a	top-down	necessity.	They	derive	their	necessity	from	a	law-giver	and	they	determine	how	things	must	behave	in	the	world;	that	is,	they	ground	and	explain	the	regular	patterns	there	are	in	the	world.	Laws,	in	this	sense,	are	‘behind’	the	regularity	there	is	in	the	world	and	ground	it.			 As	we	have	seen,	however,	laws	kept	a	key	feature	of	powers:	they	imposed	necessary	connections	in	nature,	though	there	was	a	shift	in	how	exactly	necessity	was	conceived.	Cartesian	laws	hold	with	metaphysical	necessity;	not	so	for	the	rest	of	the	thinkers	we	examined:	laws	hold	with	natural	necessity	and	impose	patterns	of	naturally	necessary	connections	in	nature.		
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The	shift	from	powers	to	laws	came	with	a	tension,	which	was	accentuated	by	the	fact	that	matter	was	taken	to	be	inert	and	causally	inactive.	This	tension	is	captured	by	the	following	two	questions:	How	can	things	obey	laws	if	they	do	not	have	the	power	to	do	so?	How	can	a	powerless	matter	execute	the	laws?	Laws	are	supposed	to	govern	the	behaviour	of	things;	things	in	some	sense	obey	them	and	hence	execute	them.	But	as	Leibniz	forcefully	argued,	for	matter	to	be	capable	of	executing	a	law,	matter	must	have	suitable	powers.	With	Leibniz	powers	re-enter	the	stage	as	that	in	virtue	of	which	bodies	are	subject	to	laws	and	able	to	execute/obey	the	laws.	Laws	then	seem	to	require	powers	to	enforce	necessary	connections	in	the	world.	But	how	do	objects	acquire	their	powers?	For	Leibniz,	as	we	have	seen,	powers	are	identified	independently	of	laws.		But	two	other	answers	to	this	question	became	available.	One	was	Hume’s,	and	the	other	was	Newton’s.	For	Hume,	there	are	no	powers.	The	laws	of	nature	are	regularities.	For	Newton,	powers	and	laws	enter	the	world	hand-in-hand,	as	it	were.	Unlike	Hume,	Newton	was	far	from	accepting	that	there	is	no	natural	necessity.	Still,	of	this	necessity	nothing	can	be	known	except	whatever	is	given	to	us	as	(mathematically	characterised)	regularities.	If	there	is	natural	necessity	in	nature,	(Newton	thinks	there	is),	it	can	never	be	found	out.		But	let’s	compare	Newton	with	Hume	once	more:	If	God	is	left	out	of	the	picture,	and	if	natural	necessity	cannot	be	otherwise	grounded	in	(the	independently	posited)	natures	or	powers	all	we	are	left	with	are	regularities	which	can	be	known	only	as	(mathematically	characterised)	regularities	(and	never	qua	natural	necessities).	These,	plausibly,	are	the	laws	of	nature	for	both	Hume	and	Newton.	
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